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From a mathematical point of view one of the chief interests 
of Aiton's book is perhaps his frequent and pertinent comments 
on the role and the form of mathematical reasoning both as 
hypothesis-testing and theory-building in those early days of 
the evolution of dynamics. The delicate interplay of dynamical 
arguments and mathematical methods is demonstrated not only by 
emphasizing the inadequacy of the mathematical foundation of 
the majority of vortex theories, but also by analyzing the 
concept-generating properties of the rare exceptions: the 
theories of Huygens, Leibniz, Saurin, and the Bernoullis. Even 
the great (but by no means firm and in its original form never 
complete) success of Newton's system is shown to be chiefly the 
result of a dynamically (at least at an abstract level) simply 
interpretable mathematical model, making possible easy and 
surprisingly exact calculations. This interpretational unity 
and numerical superiority of Newton's system largely compensated 
for the then far from negligible metaphysical drawback of the 
introduction of "an attraction, whose nature even its supporters 
did not attempt to explain." However, there was nothing like a 
revolutionary switchover from one theory to the other, nor was 
"puzzle-solving" at a certain time replaced by a scientific 
revolution. Even as late as the age of Daniel Bernoulli *'the 
choice between the Cartesian and Newtonian systems was not 
simply a question of deciding between logical alternatives, but 
involved a subjective judgment after weighing the various argu- 
ments for and against the two systems." "Maupertuis' Newtonianism" 
for instance "sprang from the failure of the Cartesian theory to 
explain phenomena, especially Kepler's laws." Is it necessary 
to call attention to how "Popperian" the thinking of Aiton's 
Maupertuis is? One of the charms of this useful and learned 
book is that it displays how an "old-style" Koyr6an analysis, if 
ably done, may lead to a quite fashionable "rational reconstruc- 
tion," which may hold (or may be falsified) even in our 
Feyerabend-paradox-haunted days of history and philosophy of 
science. 
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The concept of cause has played a central role throughout the 
long history of man's attempts to understand the natural world, 
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and indeed for most scientists a successful explanation of a 
phenomenon simply means an understanding of its causes. From 
the four causes of Aristotle through the detailed analyses of 
the medieval and classical scientists and the philosophers of 
the post-classical period down to the scientists and philosophers 
of today, the concept of cause has undergone many vicissitudes. 
Several times it has been buried but always it has reappeared 
again, albeit in a somewhat different guise. Whatever philoso- 
phers say explicitly, their words very often implicitly refer to 
causal processes, and working scientists always think in terms 
of causes. The importance of causality is still undiminished 
today, as it has a vital bearing on the claims of rival philoso- 
phies of science. 
This scholarly and detailed study of the history of the 
concept of cause is thus particularly welcome, for only when we 
see how it has developed in the past, how it has weathered 
scientific revolutions and survived philosophical attacks and 
refutations, can we see it in its full power and flexibility. 
The first volume covers Medieval and Early Classical Science. 
After an introductory chapter on the ancient Greeks, particularly 
Aristotle, Pythagoras and Plato, the first part is divided into 
chapters on medieval science in Oxford, Paris and Padua. In 
Oxford, Grosseteste and the Mertonians refined Aristotle's 
analysis of the four causes and drew the essential distinction 
between explanations that do no more than account for the 
appearances and those that give the real true causes of the 
phenomena. This was further developed in Paris by Albertus 
Magnus and Aquinas, and experimental method was significantly 
advanced by Peter of Maricourt and Theodoric of Freiburg. The 
Paris Terminists Jean Buridan, Albert of Saxonay and Nicole 
Oresme made fundamental advances in the science of dynamics. 
This work was continued in the University of Padua and paved the 
way for the vital advances made by Galileo. 
The second part is devoted to early classical science, and 
describes the work of Gilbert, Kepler, Galileo, Harvey and 
Newton. The founders of classical science were very concerned 
about scientific methodology and were at pains to explain and 
justify their work. The decisive step was to concentrate on the 
measurable aspects of phenomena, to describe them by simple laws 
and then to show how these can be deduced from a more general 
theory. Newton's celebrated dictum "hypotheses non fingo" is 
sometimes interpreted as implying a purely hypothetical methodo- 
logy, but this is true only in the sense that he made no specu- 
lations about the nature of gravity itself. Nevertlleless he 
rightly believed that in his theory of gravity he had found the 
proximate cause and explanation of a wide range of terrestrial 
and celestial phenomena, and similarly with his theories of 
optics and of colours. 
The second volume begins with the philosophers of classical 
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science, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Leibniz and 
Kant. Of these, Hume made the most acid critique of causality, 
and is generally thought to have banished it altogether. Yet a 
detailed examination of his writings shows that “whatever his 
disavowals of a metaphysical type of knowledge in the Berkeleyian 
sense, he actually subscribed to a realist epistomology when 
concerned with topics relating to the new ‘experimental’ science, 
and this even in matters relating to causality.” Similarly Kant 
is usually understood to have imposed an a priori limitation on 
human knowing, that “effectively reduces any claim for causal 
knowledge to the somewhat gratuitous operation of a mind- 
structuring reality according to a causal principle it has itself 
fabricated.” Yet his analysis of the metaphysical foundations 
of natural science together with later unpublished manuscripts 
shows that for Kant scientific explanations are causal explana- 
tions and that he saw causal knowledge as the only way of 
guaranteeing the possibility of science. In both these examples 
we see the acknowledgement of the validity of Newtonian science 
forcing a profound modification of previously elaborated ideas, 
particularly those relating to causality. 
The second chapter of Volume II is devoted to the methodolo- 
gists of classical science. Some, like John Herschel, Calude 
Bernard and William Whewell, were practising scientists, while 
others like Francis Bacon, Comte and Mill, wrote without such 
firsthand,knowledge. Particularly in the case of Mill, this 
reduced the value of their work, so that although his rules of 
induction were well-known among philosophers they had practically 
no influence on practising scientists. 
The final part deals with contemporary science, and surveys 
first of all the decline and fall of causality associated with 
phenomenalism, conventionalism, logical positivism, operationalism 
and the Copenhagen school. More recently there has been a 
revival of interest in causality in the context of the critical 
realism of Bunge, Harr6 and others, and the significance of this 
work is assessed. 
The development of modern physics has strongly influenced our 
concept of causality, and the implications of quantum mechanics, 
particularly of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and of 
special and general relativity are surveyed. Concluding sections 
deal with cause in the biological and social sciences. 
This brief summary of contents indicates the scope of Wallace’s 
books, but not the detail and clarity of his exposition. Parti- 
cularly notable is the way he goes deeper than the prevailing 
accounts of the works of many philosophers and shows how a 
balanced study of all their works leads to a significant re- 
assessment of their concepts of causality. 
A notable omission is any account of the hidden variable 
problem in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. It has been 
maintained that quantum events have no causal antecdents whatever, 
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and the proof of Von Neumann is quoted in support. If this is 
true, then it is the death of causality, and so the correctness 
of this argument is vital for any discussion of the concept of 
cause. The argument has been contested, particularly by Bohm, 
De Broglie, Vigier and Bell, and the whole history of the debate 
has recently been summarised by Belinfante. 
Apart from this, Wallace has given a remarkably thorough 
account of the development of the concept of causality through 
the labours of scientists and philosophers. It will be most 
useful as a work of reference and by its clarity and thoroughness 
has contributed significantly to our understanding of one of the 
most important concepts in the philosophy of science. 
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This book is a translation, with revisions, of the author’s 
Zur Friihgeschichte der Technischen Regelungen (1969). It is one 
of those rare works that explore the historical development of a 
fairly abstract and specialized concept with such breadth that 
one’s admiration is tempered with wonder that no one thought to 
do it before. However the author’s manifest enthusiasm does not 
lead him to cut the corners, and he is insistent on rigorous 
definition of his subjects. Thus he concludes that the oft-quoted 
example of the mill-hopper is not a genuine case of feedback 
control since, although the system constitutes a formally closed 
loop, its property of self-regulation is inherent and not delib- 
erately contrived with distinct elements physically identifiable. 
In the same spirit he makes frequent use of block-diagrams, which 
will not endear him to those averse to mathematical symbolism. 
A recurrent motif in Mayr’s account is the floating valve 
regulator, associated with the earliest water-clocks in the pre- 
Christian Hellenic world, in ancient China and in mediaeval 
Arabic works. Remarkably, he finds no evidence whatever for any 
such device between 1206 and the middle of the eighteenth century, 
when the simultaneous appearance of these and other feedback 
mechanisms leads him to some interesting conclusions about the 
changing attitudes to machinery and systems in general. Other 
feedback devices described include that boon to seventeenth 
century chemists, the thermostat, pressure regulators, various 
adjuncts to milling machinery, and the centrifugal engine goverrror. 
The book is well illustrated, excellently indexed, fully 
documented, and free from all but a few misprints. It will be of 
great value to all concerned with the history of technology, 
applied mathematics, or modern servo:mechanisms. 
